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AIR FREEDOM: THE SECOND BATTLE
OF THE BOOKS*
JOSEPH F. ENGLISHt
In 1608 a young lawyer by the name of Grotius, employed
by the Dutch East India Company, who had written, "the greatest
gift any lawyer ever gave to the world"' published his Mare
Liberum. This work was answered by John Selden of the Inner
Temple, with a work entitled Mare Clausum. The war was on.
But the gods of battle fought against Selden and today the world
rejoices in the freedom of the seas.
Three hundred years later the international lawyers of the
world were again marshaled in a similar conflict. This time the
casus belli was the freedom of the air.
The first gun of this modern "Battle of the Books"-which
was so abruptly ended by the ultimatums of 1914, thereby closing
the air frontiers of the European countries-was fired as far back
as the Franco-Prussian War, when French balloons flew over Ger-
man lines seeking information, and Bismarck threatened to treat
their occupants as spies.2
The Grotius of this battle was the French jurist, M. Paul
Fauchille, who in 1901 hurled the projectile carrying the message
that the air was free; while the Seldens were once again English,
among whom were Dr. Hazeltine, Professor Westlake, Sir ErIe
Richards and Dr. Lycklama i Nijeholt, who responded with a
shot from an old musket that the air was closed.
This time, as we shall see, the gods of battle ably assisted
the English and their allies, and today the world rejoices in the en--
closure of the air.
It should prove interesting, at this date, as a lesson in history,
to review the struggle and to study its effects. Has the armistice
that resulted in the Paris Convention of 1919 completely silenced
the booming of the guns, or will the muffled throb of the crippled
*This paper is a semester essay prepared tinder the direction of James
J. Hayden, Catholic University School of Law, Washington, D. C.
tMr. English is a graduate student at Catholic University School of
Law.
1. Blewett Lee, Sovereignty of the Air, 7 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 470.
2. Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 Cornell Law Quart., 271-309.




artillery of the defeated champions of air freedom burst forth in
a final endeavor to free aerial navigation from its prison within
the confines of the subjacent state? That it will has been recently
stated by Henry-Coiiannier, when he said that sovereignty will
either be accepted for a short time only, or remain a dead letter,
in view of the ever-pressing necessity to yield to the requirements
of international air navigation. 4 Or has a new principle of in-
ternational law been "established as the result of custom adhered
to through the World War and finding its sanction in modern aerial
jurisprudence ?"5
The outbreak of the struggle found the defeated army, then
large in numbers, bombarding the original handful of courageous
victors so fiercely that the result trembled in the balance; and only
the strategic maneuvers of Professor Westlake and his handful
of followers, who "sent the sword of sovereignty clanging into the
scales," 6 saved the day for the contenders for the sovereignty of
the air.
At the threshold of the struggle we find that the plan of com-
paign advanced by the various contenders can be no better shown
than by resorting to the 1913 report of the committee on aviation
of the International Law Association.
As to whom the air space over a subjacent state belongs, the
report stated that there were two main schools of thought: (1)
Those who maintain that the air space is of its nature free-this
theory being that of the freedom of the air space. (2) Those who
maintain the theory of the sovereignty of the subjacent state in the
air space above its territory.
The first school may again be divided into partisans of: (a)
Air freedom without restriction. (b) Air freedom restricted by
some special rights (not limited as regards height) of the subja-
cent state. (c) Air freedom restricted by a territorial zone.
Those who maintain the sovereignty theory may also be sub-
divided into partisans of: (a) Full sovereignty up to a limited
height only; (b) Full sovereignty restricted by the right of in-
nocent passage for aerial navigation. (c) Full sovereignty without
any restrictions.7
4. Henry-Coiian nier, P-1ments Createur Du Droit Arien, Paris, 1929,
Pp. 144-145.
5. Spiropulos, Der Luftraum Integrierender Teil Des Staatsgebietes Pp.
115, 116.
6. Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 5.
7. 28 Reports International Law Association, 530.
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Air Freedom Without Restriction
The view that the air is completely free was held by a number
of publicists of distinction. Wheaton, Bluntschli, Pradier-Fodere,
Stephan and Nys were the staunch supporters of this contention.
Expressions such as these formed the basis upon which rested the
theory: "The sea is an element that, like the air, belongs to all,
and for this reason no nation has a right of possessing it." "States
have no authority in the air, because they are unable to enclose it
within their boundaries." "The great currents of air are not legally
under the control of the State." "Air space is incapable of owner-
ship or of sovereignty, and therefore free to all."
'8
All of the writers who defend the liberty of the air without
restriction are, as Hazeltine pointed out, with the exception of
Nys, thinking of the air as an element.' This thought had its in-
ception in the works of Grotius and in the Roman Law.
Under the Roman Law the air, as an element, was considered
res communis with respect to all mankind. The fragment "aer res
communis" is repeated in the following passages from the Corpus
Juris Civilis:
I. 2, 1, 1, "the following things are by natural law common
to all: the air, running water, the sea."
D. 1, 8, 2, 1 (Marcianus) ". by natural law, the
following things are common to all: The air, flowing
water, the sea."
D. 43, 8, 3, 1 (Celus) " the use of the sea is com-
mon to all, and the use of the sea shores, and that
of the air."
D. 43, 10, 13, 7 (Ulpian) "The sea and the sea shore is
common to all, as also the air."
According to Sohm, the Romans "applied the word res to any
thing that can form a part of a person's property. Things
must necessarily be the object of human rights. Certain
things are prevented by a rule of law from being the object of
private rights. Such things are called res extra commercium. Of
res extra commercium we have three classes: res divini juris, res
publicae, res omnium communes. . . Res communes are
not, properly speaking, things in the legal sense of the term, just
as little as the sun, the moon and the stars, or the atoms and the
ultimate particles of the naturalists, are things. For the atmosphere
8. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 11.
9. Op. cit., p. 11.
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of the earth, the ocean, and the flowing water of a natural stream
(aqua profluens) are not, as such, susceptible of human dominion."' 1
Grotius stated that the sea was "common" to all men, which
he followed up with: "The same may be said of the air as com-
mon property, except that no one can use or enjoy it without at
the same time using the ground over which it passes or rests."' ,,
As was very early pointed out, those writers did not "touch
upon the question which is, of course, at the present time, the im-
portant one, as to the rights of states in the air space as such.' 2
Merely for the sake of showing the distinction between the air as
an element-"the atmosphere which completely envelopes the earth"
and which "may he considered as a fluid sea at the bottom of which
we live, and which extends upward to a considerable height, prob-
ably two hundred miles, constantly diminishing in intensity as the
altitude increases' 8-and the air space, let us use the words of
Professor Lycklama i Nijeholt, who said: "First of all
the old error . . . of considering the air as the object of dis-
cussion instead of the air space . . is obvious. Sovereignty
wants a sphere, a domain, where it can be exercised. In theory it
is of no account what there may be in that sphere; and in practice,
is the fact that it is filled with a moving element, where fixed
marks cannot well be imagined, enough to make sovereignty there
practically impossible? We think not. We think rather this con-
clusion has again its origin in too great a wish for analogy. Be-
cause on land the signs of sovereignty-buildings and boundary
marks-can have a fixity, which in sea and air is out of the ques-
tion, is sovereignty there quite unacceptable. . . . Does it
not sound more rational to judge every sphere after its own nature?
Difference in substance can ask for difference in application of
the sovereignty principle. This principle is: he is sovereign who rules
within a certain sphere; if he manages to rule without fixed bound-
ary marks, he is nevertheless sovereign. There is no reason why
one should make it a condition that sea and air frontiers must be
established in a way such as to make it impossible to respect them
literally to an inch, which, of course, is only possible on land."' 4
Or we might quote Mr. Hine's conclusion after reading the case
10. Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law (Ledlie's Trans.) 3 ed. London 1907,
p. 303.
11. Grotius, Rights of War and Peace (Campbell's trans.) London 1814,
p. 229.
12. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 11.
13. Bowditcth, American Practical Navigator, 1918 reprint, p. 206.
14. Lycklama 4 Nijeholt, Air Sovereignty, p. 22.
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of Butler v. Frontier Telegraph Company.15 "Another favorite
argument of advocates of freedom of the air is that the air is con-
stantly in motion and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The right of the owner of the surface, however, to exclude tres-
passers from the air space does not depend on his ownership of
the fugitive air, but on his ownership of the space temporarily
occupied by the fugitive air."1  In discussing Public Utility Air
Rights Mr. Theodore Schmidt says: "Air rights . .. is
the expression commonly used to describe the right to occupy the
space above the surface or lower levels of land. . . . It does
not accurately describe.the nature of the right: for the upper oc-
cupier is not interested in the air as such . . but the upper
occupier is interested rather in the right to occupy with a building
or other structure and appurtenances, the space above a certain
level of a given tract of land. '
17
Nys was conscious of this distinction but nevertheless argued
for the complete freedom of the air space. In his report to the
Institut de Droit International at Brussels in 1902, he contended
that there was no real necessity for the right of preservation and
defense, and that if the existence of such a right were admitted the
principle of the freedom of the air would be lost in a mass of pro-
tectional rules and regulations by the territorial State. 8 He looked
upon the air as a world-sea and upon air vehicles as vessels sail-
ing through this sea of air. Just as the sea itself is open and free
to the maritime trade of the world, so the air-sea is open and free
to the aerial trade of the world. Just as vessels on the high sea
are viewed as detached portions of the homeland, so vessels in the
air are to be viewed as detached portions of the homeland of the
air vessels. He places the high seas of water and the high seas of
air upon a fully and completely equal footing."'
The doctrine of air freedom without restriction, while it re-
ceived early consideration, was soon abandoned by most writers.
It is based upon the theory that the air is by its nature free, just
as is the sea. Kuhn in discussing the reasons advanced by Grotius
in denying all sovereignty over the sea said: ". . . Roman
ideas of private property had been supplanted by the modern theory
that the freedom of the seas is predicated on the impossibility of
effective control by any state. Therein lies the difference, for the
15. 186 N. Y. 486.
16. Hine, Home versus Aeroplane, 16 Am. Bar Ass'n. Journal, 220.
17. Schmidt, Public Utility Air Rights, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 53.
18. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 12.
19. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 14.
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states are not thus impotent in respect of the abutting air space.
It is true that their control may not be complete, any more than it is
upon the land; but as soon as the art has been regularly established,
states will be able to execute their will upon the zone abutting
them from above. As one writer has said, "the air is at all events
not the sea, an aircraft no ship, and a complete analogy is neither
made de lege lata nor advisable de lege ferenda' "20 Another writer
has said, "Those publicists who insisted upon complete freedom of
the air were found not to have given sufficient consideration to two
facts: First, that the law of gravity makes all heavier-than-air
craft potentially dangerous to the inhabitants of the subjacent land
while such craft are passing through the air space over such land;
and second, that aircraft must avail themselves of the use of the
surface of the earth and the surface air space . . . in alight-
ing and taking off. Control of the airspace was therefore necessary
in order that the subjacent state might adequately protect itself
from attack or unintentional injury and might adequately enforce
its customs, immigration, and health laws." 1  The all too ready
impulse to argue from analogy has led the writers to such a position
that its logical effect would result in an absurdity; for the territorial
state could not prevent a fleet of airship from flying over its terri-
tory carrying bombs or photographic apparatus. Even within the
marginal seas, health regulations and laws for the protection of
the littoral state are universally recognized.
Air Freedom Restricted by Some Special Rights-Not Limited
as Regards Height
The weight of authority before the war favored the freedom
of the air subject to some special rights of the subjacent state.
The lesser number of publicists did not restrict the exercise of
these rights as regards height. The Institute of International Law,
at a session at Ghent, 1906, drafted a project which stated that
the air is free. States have no authority over it, in time of peace
or in time of war, other than that which is necessary for their own
preservation.2 2  This was the result of a discussion over the juris-
diction of the air space which came up in a practical form in rela-
tion to the control of wireless telegraphy. At this session, which
occurred just before the diplomatic conference of Berlin on radio-
telegraphy, Professor Westlake of Cambridge introduced -the sover-
20. Kuhn, Beginnings, Aerial Law, 4 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 113.
21. Lee, Civil Aeronautics, Leg. History of Air Commerce Act, p. 121.
22. Supp. 7 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 147 (1913).
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eignty theory.28 At its session in Madrid in 1911, the Institute
again voted in favor of the freedom of the air subject to the right
of the' ground state to take measures necessary for the proper
security of themselves and of the persons and property of their
inhabitants.2 4 Meili, in 1908, stated: "That the air, together with
the aerial space, is free, that is to say, it is at the disposition of all
nations, under this reserve, that each territorial state can do that
which is necesasry for its own preservation." He later stated that
the air should be free for aerial navigation, but that each state
should have certain rights, not limited horizontally for the pre-
servation of their interests, enabling them to defend themselves
against balloons and aeroplanes . 2
This theory is based on the argument that the "air is physically
incapable of appropriation because it cannot be continuously oc-.
cupied. '26  Grotius relied upon this argument in his attack upon
the Portugese. All property, he says, is grounded upon occupation,
which requires that moveables shall be seized and that immoveable
things shall be enclosed; whatever therefore cannot be so seized
or enclosed is incapable of being made a subject of property. The
vagrant waters of the ocean are thus necessarily free. The right
of occupation, again, rests upon the fact that most things become
exhausted by promiscuous use, and that appropriation consequently
is the condition of their utility to human beings. But this is not
the case with the sea; it can be exhausted neither by navigation
nor by fishing, that is to say, in neither of the two ways in which
it can be used.2 ' Dr. McNair pointed out in one of his lectures
at the Air Law Institute that sovereignty does not really involve
continual presence any more than private law involves possession.
"A state can exercise sovereignty over a huge desert, for instance,
if it is in de facto control and is in a position to suppress internal
disorder and repel external attack."2 "
Air Freedom Restricted by a Territorial Zone
Of those writers who advocated the complete freedom of the
air, subject to certain right of self preservation, the majority favored
the institution of a zone within which those rights could be exer-
23. Meyers, The Freedom of the Air, 24 Green Bag, 430.
24. Lee, The Sovereignty of the Air, 7 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 478.
25. Lycklama d Nijeholt, The Sovereignty of the Air, p. 11, 12.
26. McNair, 1 JOURN. AIR LAw, 384.
27. Grotius, Mare Liberum, Cap. 5.
28. McNair, oP. cit. p. 384.
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cised by the subjacent state. Above that zone the air was completely
free from any interference by the ground state.
The father of this plan was M. Paul Fauchille, well known
as the editor of the Revue ginirale de droit international public,
and to him is probably due the honor of being the pioneer in this
field of legislation. As early as 1900, at an annual conference of
the Institute of International Law, he proposed as a subject to con-
stitute part of the order of the day for the next session, Le R~gime
juridique des airostats. This was accepted and, accordingly, at the
following session Fauchille presented a detailed study of the sub-
ject, supplemented by a proposed legislative draft consisting of
thirty-two paragraphs. 20
The arguments advanced by the above writers who favored
the complete freedom of the air and those who restricted it with
some special rights, not limited as regards height, were also used
by Fauchille and his followers. "The air is free in principle, they
allege, though the state must have certain rights, perhaps by analogy
with the coast waters." 30 Despagnet said: "In itself the air does
not seem susceptible of being the object of a right of property or of
sovereignty, but each state ought to have the right of preventing
such use of the air as is dangerous to its own security. The analogy
of the maritime belt could be applied to the air space above the
land."'" Merignhac maintained that the air is free except a terri-
torial atmosphere, the height of which can be fixed by conventions.
Oppenheim claimed that the territorial atmosphere is not a special
part of the territory of the state, but each state can exercise juris-
diction up to a certain height.8 2 Because the views of Fauchille
received such wide acceptance before the World War they will be
set out more fully. His views are expressed very clearly in the
seventh article of his draft code submitted to the Institute of In-
ternational Law at its Brussels meeting in 1902. The seventh
article reads as follows: "The Air is free. States have in the air
in time of peace and in time of war only those rights which are
necessary for their preservation. These rights relate to the pre-
vention of espionage, to customs and sanitary regulations, and to
the necessities of defense." He argues that you cannot own the
air because you cannot appropriate and continuously occupy it. For
the same reasons you cannot exercise sovereign jurisdiction in the
29. Kuhn, Beginnings of Aerial Law, 6 Am. Jour. Int. Law, p. 111.
30. Lycklama d Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air, p. 12.
31. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 16.
32. Lycklamna d Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air, p. 12.
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air. Though admitting that space can be dominated by the cannon
and human vision he claims that they are only means of preserv-
ing a sovereignty which has already been acquired. In answer to
the question as to how can the free use of the atmosphere by states
be kept within proper limits he replied that the principle of inter-
national law would take care of the situation. A state has the
right to defend itself against any act that interferes with its "terri-
tory, its population, its material wealth." 3  From this we see that
Fauchille gives to the states only those rights in the air over their
territory as are necessary to its preservation and defense.
Dr. Hazeltine has briefly summarized certain consequences that
can be drawn from Fauchille's theory, viz: (1) The state can
therefore prohibit the circulation of air-vehicles below (but not
above) a certain height, except for the purpose of arrival upon
the state's territory and except for the purpose of departure. He
thus fixes a zone of air from which the traffic of air-vehicles is es-
sentially excluded. The height at which he would fix this zone
has not been constant. His first height was 1500 meters, while he
later reduced it to 500 meters. (2) The second consequence is that
in order to protect itself from espionage the state has the right
to prohibit aerial navigation in certain regions of the atmosphere,
more especially those aerial regions which surround fortifications.
(3) The state can protect its own economic and sanitary interests
in the aerial space. (4) Both public and private air-vessels are
subject, for acts which take place upon them, only to the law and
justice of the country whose flag they fly. (5) The territorial state
can prevent the passage of foreign military airships.
3 4
These zone theories are also based upon the analogy of the
high seas. Lycklama A Nijeholt admits that the analogy has some
application since "the general disposition and nature, the wide ex-
panse, the continually changing of both sea and air certainly justify
a comparison to some extent. For why do we compare? To find
cases where existing rules can be applied, to lighten the work of
lawmakers. And in the air there will certainly be cases where mari-
time rules will apply." The claim is made that arguing from
analogy will lead to the establishment of original rules that will
determine the position of the air space in the law of nations, and
will further show that existing rules can have no application. In
discussing the relation between the air space and the underlying
sovereign territory and the sea and the land Lycklama A Nijeholt
33. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 18-19.
34. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 21-23.
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admitted that, "The sea being res nullius does not hurt the rights
of any state. . . . The farther we are off in a horizontal
direction, the less direct utility and the less direct danger the land
may expect from us. . . . What happens outside the maritime
belt is not often likely to re-act upon the land," but at the same time
it was insisted that "above the land' is a different thing from
"at the side of the land." Lycklama Nijeholt showed that " a
great distance in a vertical direction by no means implies propor-
tionally less danger from the underlying land. 5  In commenting
upon the above analogy Professor Zollmann wrote: "The analogy
itself is unsatisfactory, for the distance in the case of the sea is
horizontal, and hence affords protection from attack, while in the
case of the air, it is vertical, and affords no such protection. Fur-
thermore, in the case of the sea, it is a narrow fringe along the
shore, while in the case of the air, it is a layer even broader than
the land itself."3 Dr. Hazeltine found that the "analogy of the
high seas is not satisfying, and indeed very little is really left
of the conception of freedom after supporters of the theory have
accorded the territorial state various rights to be exercised either
without limit in height or within a certain fixed zone. '3 7 "Fauchille
and his school give with the one hand and take away with the
other. They give to aerial navigation a so-called 'freedom of the
air' and at the same time they rob this so-called freedom-of much,
very much--of its significance by giving the territorial state most
important rights within this protective zone, for it is precisely within
the limits of such a zone-the air space above the land up to a
certain height-that aerial navigation must largely be carried on.
Fauchille's theory of freedom therefore, turns out to be not strictly
a theory of complete freedom at all, but a theory of limited free-
dom."""
Full Sovereignty Up to a Limited Height Only
The view that the ground state has sovereign rights in the air
space was expressed very early in the debate over the freedom of the
air. All of the publicists do not assert that the state has full sover-
eign rights in the air space. They restrict this right by a territorial
zone where the ground state may exercise full jurisdiction, and
not merely the right of conservation, and above which the air is
35. Lycklama a Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air, p. 21-24.
36. Zollrnann, Law of the Air, p. 2.
37. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 24-25.
38. Ibid., p. 27.
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completely free. H. B. Leech, writing in the Fortnightly Review
for August, 1912, favored the view that the portion of the atmos-
phere which is within the range of artillery situated upon the ground
should be regarded as similar to the territorial waters of all na-
tions, while aerial heights beyond the reach of artillery should be
regarded like the high seas and free alike to airships of all nations."
The freedom theory and this theory of sovereignty agree to the
extent of saying that above a certain height the air is completely
free. The writers who support this zone theory of sovereignty
are at variance as to the height of this zone. "Thus, von Holzen-
dorf places the upper limit of the zone at 1000 meters from the
surface of the earth, measured from the highest point of land.
Von Bar places the upper limit of the zone very much lower, only
50 or 60 meters from the land; von Liszt in 1902 expressed the
view that the limit of the zone should be placed as high as the
air space can be actually dominated, either by ordnance or by aerial
navigation. So, to, Rivier, Pietri and Hilti place the limit of this
zone at the height reached by artillery upon the earth. 40
The desire for analogy has again made itself apparent because
the above theory is based upon the law as applicable to marginal
seas. But as the original reason given for the establishment of the
three mile limit-the range of artillery then in use-would not be
accepted today were it for the first time to be announced, neither
will the reason advanced by these writers for the establishment of
a zone over which the state is sovereign find a sympathetic ear.
Modern invention will laugh to scorn any attempt to invade the air
at a height that cannot be reached by a gun. The strongest argu-
ment that can be used against the writers expresses itself in the
fact that above this sovereign zone foreign airships would b! free
to navigate at will in the air space.
This section of the discussion will be closed with a reference
to the article by Meyers. In speaking about the analogy of the
seas to the air he said, "The analogy is wrong in practice and there-
fore wrong in law, which has for one of its important functions
the recognition of distinctions not apparent to the laymen, and of
effecting justice by that recognition." The land inhabitant has no
general interest in what occurs upon the sea which is at the side
of the land where he dwells. "We read of a wreck at sea-we
who have no maritime investments of loved ones or money-and
by no possible method of philosophy can we conjure up a legal
39. Lee, 7 Am. Jour. Int. Law, p. 474, citation.
40. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 32.
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interest in the incident. . . . The beach or shore is a neu-
tral zone, inevitably dividing the sea from the land. All aircraft
operate above, not at the side of, the land. Except over water,
no water, no aviator can even throw out ballast without it reaching
somebody's property and there is no neutral zone of beach to re-
ceive it or act as a buffer between the two elements. The sea wreck
affects only the individuals who have intrusted persons or cargo
to the vessel; it sinks in a waste of water where no man has an
interest. The aerial wreck will fall upon occupied territory, will
affect those landholders who have no special interest in the machine
or its cargo. . . The air is an appendage indivisible from
the earth, and any use made of it should be predicated upon the
legal theory that recognizes that fact."41
Sovereignty to an Unlimited Altitude But Restricted by a Servitude
At the beginning of this battle over the freedom of the air
the foremost opponents that the contenders had were Westlake
and Meurer. They argued for the sovereignty principle but, rec-
ognizing the need of unimpeded aerial navigation, were willing to
permit the right of innocent passage through the air. What West-
lake said at the opening of the general discussion of Fauchille's
report to the meeting of the Institute of International Law, will
be set out in full. "I accept battle upon the base of the report,
that is, upon the principle of the liberty of the air, or more exactly,
of the aerial space. The air is itself something that cannot be
possessed. It is transported from place to place at the will of the
winds, today in Belgium, tomorrow in France or in Holland; that
which we have around us is not air, it is aerial space. Oceanic
space and aerial space are two spaces upon which the adjacent state
has a 'droit de conservation' and the other state a 'droit de passage
innocent.' Conservation and passage-how can these two rights be
combined? Which of them is the rule and which the exception?
For the reporter (Fauchille) it is the right of passage which is
first and fundamental. For me it .is the right of conservation.
Of these two rules that one which deserves to be the rule is the
one which is the more precise; and yet the 'droit de conservation'
is much clearer than the 'droit de passage.' That is why the In-
stitute, when it was faced with this question A propos of the oceanic
space, replied that in the territorial sea the 'droit de souverainetW'
is the rule and the 'droit de passage' the exception. If that holds
41. Meyers, Sovereignty of the Air, Vol. 24, Green Bag, p. 229.
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good as regards the oceanic space it ought also to hold good as
regards the aerial space. The only difficulty is that it is not possible
to limit this solution to a certain height. On the sea the farther
people go from the coast the less is the risk of their causing de-
struction and disturbance upon the coast. In the air the higher
one ascends the greater becomes the destructive force of objects
thrown from the balloon upon the earth. If there does exist a
limit to the sovereignty of the state in the oceanic space, such a
limit does not' exist in the aerial space. The right of the terri-
torial state remains the same whatever the distance from the earth."' 2
At the meeting of the International Law Association held in
Madrid in 1913, the Association adopted the following resolution:
1. It is the right of every state to enact such prohibitions, restric-
tions, and regulations as it may think proper in regard to the passage
of aircraft through the air space above its territory and territorial waters.
2. Subjacent to the right of the subjacent state liberty of passage
ought to be freely accorded to the aircraft of every nation."'4
This doctrine was enunciated at a time when the majority of
international publicists and organizations favored the freedom of
the air principle.
This association saw the best solution in recognizing that the
subjacent state was sovereign over the air space though it at the
same time insisted that in the interest of the progress of aerial
navigation, each state should grant the right of innocent passage
through its air space.
Blewett Lee holds that the air is under the jurisdiction of the
subjacent state because; "The underlying state is able by physical
force to control to a great extent the use of the air just as in case
of territorial waters; ... So long as the right of innocent
passage is preserved to private airships of other nations under
reasonable regulations for the protection of the underlying state,
they have no real grievance . . . ."" Kuhn suggests that,
"The right of the craft of one nation freely to traverse the air
space of another might be compared with that of vessels of one
state freely to navigate the river of a co-riparian state, especially
when the river becomes navigable within its own territory. The
doctrine now generally accepted recognizes a right of absolute ex-
clusion, though its exercise would be deemed harsh and, unless
required by actual necessity, unjustifiable from the point of view
of neighborly conduct and comity.""
42. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 34-35 citation.
43. Report 28th Conference, Int. Law Ass'n., 1914, p. 533.
44. 17 Am. Jour. Int. Law, 491.
45. Kuhn, Beginnings of Aerial Law, 4 Am. Jour. Int. law, 114, citation.
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Here we have again a theory that rests upon the analogy of
the high seas-this one more particularly of the marginal seas.
It gives to the states the same rights in the air space as international
law gives them in the territorial waters. But to argue, "that be-
cause there exists at the present time a right of innocent passage
through the territorial waters, there should also exist a right of
free passage through the air, is to argue from an analogy that is
not logically and practically sound" 46 because, "the great difference
lies in the fact that whereas the maritime belt is not strictly nec-
essary for the existence of the state, the air space is"; for "as
human beings cannot live in a plane, the state, having to deal with
living people, is obliged to have a domain of three dimensions.
And man preferring to live not under, but above the surface of
the earth, the state must needs have the necessary third dimension
extend above the surface too. Placing the air frontier just where
the land ceases would therefore make, the land worthless, the ex-
istence of the state practically impossible. . . . There is no
reason, anyhow, to claim the right of free passage for aeronauts by
analogy of the right of free passage through the territorial waters. 4 :
Full Sovereignty Without Any Restriction
We have now arrived at the prevailing view and the theory
that is presumed when international conventions are being framed.
As early as 1910, Lycklama A. Nijeholt stated the view that
the passage of time was to support. It was said: "We therefore
conclude that the state sovereignty reaches quite as high as the
state's interest can reach, the possibility of which ends at the upper-
most limit of the atmosphere . . . in principle the air space
belongs to the sovereign state territory, so that has full sovereignty
to an unlimited height, which sovereignty can only be abolished or
restricted by treaty.
4 8
In 1911 Professor Hazeltine published a series of three lectures
that were delivered at Kings College in 1910. At that early date
he also favored the complete theory of sovereignty without any
restriction whatsoever and irgued that any aerial navigation over
the foreign state could be taken care of by international conven-
tions. He pointed out that states at that date had exercised sover-
eign rights in the lower stratum of the air-that is that stratum
occupied by buildings and other structures with the encircling atmos-
phere. He pointed out that laws enacted by the states with reference
46. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, p. 44.
47. Ibid., p. 37.
48. Lycklarna d Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air, p. 46.
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both to wire and wireless telegraphy clearly assume the state's right
of dominion in the air space. Furthermore the recognition by various
systems of law that the owner of land owns up to the heavens is
clearly a recognition that the state has the right to concede to land-
owners this extensive proprietary right on the air space. He showed,
by referring to an ordinance, regulating the status and employment
of airships within the town of Kissimee City in Florida that the
town claimed "jurisdiction as high as twenty kilometers, and assert-
ing that it proposes to establish an aerial police." He said further
that, what is more important, some of the great powers. such as
France and Germany, have put in force national regulations of
traffic in the air, thus assuming that they have sovereign rights in
the air space. Indeed the Berlin National Convention of 1916
relative to wireless telegraph tacitly assumes that the contracting
parties have sovereign rights in the air space. He prophesied the
turn the battle over the freedom or the sovereignty of the air was
to take at the outbreak of the World War when he said: "Indeed,
recognition of each state's full right of sovereignty will not be an
obstacle to the proper and legitimate development of aerial naviga-
tion, while at the same time it will safeguard state and private
rights and interests. Just as states have welcomed and adopted
the principle of internationalism as regards sea navigation in terri-
torial waters, international railway and motor traffic on land, inter-
wireless communication, and admission of aliens to the enjoyment
of the laws and privileges of the territorial state, so, too, the self-
interest of states will naturally lead them to welcome and develop
this new method of navigation along international as well as na-
tional lines."4
That the Hazeltine prophesy was well founded can be shown
by referring to a statement made by Rolland in 1916, who in speak-
ing about the closing by neutral states of their air frontiers said:
"There is now a veritable custom . . the prohibition issued
seems to have been considered quite natural practically every-
where. . All the elements of a custom are here combined;
practice, a doctrinal solution in agreement with it, public opinioa
to support it."' 0 In 1919 Spaight speaks of "the recognition of
a new rule of international law. That new rule is that in war
time air frontiers are closed. . . . Right or wrong, the prin-
ciple has been established that states control the atmosphere over
their territories. '51 Bouv6 points out that Spiropulos states that
49. Hazeltine, Law of the Air, Pp. 46-52.
50. Revue de droit international, 577.
51. Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 10.
AIR FREEDOM
"with the conclusion 6f the international convention of October,
1919, in Paris, the sovereignty theory was recognized to its fullest
extent. . . . This new principle of international law, estab-
lished as the result adhered to through the World War, has found
its sanction in modern aerial jurisprudence. To' those principles
of international law already recognized, this new one is to be added:
"Aerial space above territorial land and water included within the
boundaries of a state constitute an integral part of the sovereignty
of a state." He cites Oppenheim as asserting, "At the Convention
for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, which was drawn up at the
Peace Conference . . . the parties recognized that every state
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space and its
territorial waters."
Bouv6, in discussing this particular point, stated that in the
interest of navigation in the air it became necessary to provide
for the enjoyment of innocent passage of the air craft from one
state through and over the territory of another. "Since such free-
do'm did not exist, owing to absence of a law of nations under
which it could be asserted-since, on the contrary, the principle of
aerial sovereignty born of international custom observed during the
World War was silent on the point of inno'cent passage, it was
necessary that steps be taken to bring about if possible a common
recognition of the desired and necessary privilege. But this priv-
ilege could be declared only as the result of international action
the outstanding example of group action taken by various
states is the Air Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919.
' ' 2
The first article of this convention states that:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space over its territory."
Article Two of the same convention reads as follows:
"Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace to accord free-
dom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other
contracting state, provided that the conditions laid down in the present
convention are observed."
The same provisions will be found in the Pan-American Con-
vention held at Havana, February 20, 1928, and in the Spanish-
American Conventio'n of 1926. Bouv6 concludes that: "The fact
that all civilized states the world over are enacting domestic legis-
lation covering air navigation over their territories is evidence of
the extent to which public opinion has accepted the principle of
air so'vereignty." '
52. Bouvi, Development International Rules of Cohduct in Air Navi-
gation, 1 Air Law Rev. 2.
53. Ibid.
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